The Constitutionality of Sex Separation
in School Desegregation Plans

In Brown v. Board of Education,' the Supreme Court held that statesupported segregation of students in public schools solely on the basis
of race deprives the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities2 and thereby denies them the equal protection of the

laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 3 During the following
term, the Court, after reemphasizing "the fundamental principle that
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional,"-, ordered admission "to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory
5
basis with all deliberate speed."1
Although the mandate of Brown seems clear, the attempts to desegregate public school systems through judicial intervention during
the years following the second Brown decision have met with considerable delay.6 The courts have considered desegregation plans sub1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2

Id. at 493.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.... [Ilt is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.

Id.
8 Id. at 495. Racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia was
held to be a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
The fourteenth amendment declares, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1. Soon after the ratification of the amendment, judicial pronouncement declared
the prohibitions contained therein applicable to all agencies of the states as well as to all
officers and agents by whom the powers of the states are exerted. Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346-7 (1879).
A school board is clearly an agent of the state. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958);
cf. Ex parte Virginia 100 U.S. 339, 346-7 (1879). Throughout this comment, the actions of
the school boards are presumed to be "state action" for the purpose of discussion of the
fourteenth amendment.
4 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
5 Id. at 301.
6 For example, the record of one case goes as follows:
Bush v. Orleans Parish, 138 F. Supp. 336 (3-judge 1956) motion for leave to file
petition for mandamus denied, 351 U.S. 948 . .. (1956); 138 F. Supp. 337 (1956),

Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans

297

7
mitted by the school boards which have employed "freedom-of-choice,"
"free transfer," closing of public schools and subsidizing private
schools,9 the "brother-sister rule,"' 0 "grade-a-year," 11 certain forms
of geographic zoning,12 and requests for delay in the desegregation
timetable. 13 In the cases which tested the adequacy and acceptability

of each of these devices as a means of fulfilling the mandate of Brown,
the plans were struck down because the school boards failed to persuade
the courts that the previously existing pattern of a dual system based on
race would be altered.
Recently, in at least twelve desegregation suits in the South, the
plans for school desegregation submitted by the school boards and
approved by the courts have, while integrating the school systems racially, separated the public school students according to sex.14 This
aff'd 242 F.2d 156 (1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 .. . (1957); 252 F.2d 253, cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 969 . .. (1958); 163 F. Supp. 701 (1958), aff'd 268 F.2d 78 (1959);
187 F. Supp. 42 (3-judge 1960), motion to stay denied, 364 U.S. 803 ... (1960), aff'd
365 U.S. 569 ... (1961); 188 F. Supp. 916 (3-judge 1960), motion for stay denied,
364 U.S. 500 ... (1960), aff'd 865 U.S. 569 . . .(1961); 190 F. Supp. 861 (3-judge
1960), aff'd 366 U.S. 212 ... (1961); 191 F. Supp. 871 (3-judge 1961), aff'd Denny v.
Bush, 367 U.S. 908 . . . (1961); 194 F. Supp. 182 (3-judge 1961), aff'd Tugweil v.
Bush, 367 U.S. 907 ... (1961), Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 ... (1961);
204 F. Supp. 568 (1962), 205 F. Supp. 893 (1962), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
308 F.2d 491 (1962); 230 F. Supp. 509 (1963).
United States v. Jefferson County, 372 F.2d 836, 860 n.51 (5th Cir. 1966), adopted en banc,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
As the delay by the school boards and in the courts continues, the harmful effects of
segregation are compounded. Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
7 See, e.g., Raney v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Green v. New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
8 See, e.g., Monroe v. Bd.of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
9 See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish,
197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1963).
11 See, e.g., Miller v. Barnes, 828 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1964).
12 See, e.g., Henry v. Clarksdale, 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969).
13 See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County, 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958). "The contrivances which some States have concocted to thwart the command of
our decision in Brown v. Board of Education are by now legendary." Jones v. Mayer, 392
U.S. 409, 448 n.5 (1968) (Douglas, J. concurring).
14 The following are the cases in which sex separation was'proposed by the school
board and subsequently approved by the court, or invalidated by the court, or abandoned
by the board, or is currently being litigated: Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp.
244 (E.D. La. 1969); Charles v. Ascension Parish, Civil No. 3253 (E.D. La. 1969); Williams
v. Iberville Parish, Civil No. 2921 (E.D. La. 1969); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish, 302 F.
Supp. 106 (E.D. La. 1969); Banks v. St. James Parish, Civil No. 16173 (E.D. La. 1969);
United States v. Carroll County, Civil No. GC 6541-K (N.D. Miss. 1969); United States v.
Coffeeville Consolidated School District, Civil No. WC 6957-K (N.D. Miss. 1969); United
States v. Barnwell School District (D.S.C. 1969); United States v. Catahoula Parish, Civil
No. 14430 (W.D. La. 1969); United States v. Morehouse Parish, Civil No. 14429 (W.D. La.
1969); United States v. Lincoln Parish, Civil No. 12071 (W.D. La. 1969); Smith v. Concordia Parish, Civil No. 11577 (W.D. La. 1969) (A parish in Louisiana is roughly equivalent to a county); United States v. Wilkinson County, Civil No. 1160(W) (S.D. Miss. 1969);
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comment will examine the question whether a school board may, consistently with the fourteenth amendment's equal protection requirements, dismantle a dual system based on race by substituting a dual
system based on sex. Specifically, the sex separation in school desegregation plans will be considered as (1) a facade for the state-supported
racial discrimination in public education prohibited by Brown, (2) a
form of sex discrimination which results in a denial of equal educational opportunities in violation of the fourteenth amendment, and
(3) an infringement upon the fundamental freedom of association
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The comment
will conclude with an evaluation of the justifications which may be
offered for the use of sex separation.
It is important at the outset to take note of the manner in which
courts will evaluate the sex separation schemes under consideration
here. These plans will not be treated as the normal action of a school
board where, absent a gross abuse of discretion, the action of the school
administrators will withstand legal challenge. Rather, the sex separation is part of a school desegregation plan, and the Supreme Court
has made several principles abundantly clear in the area of plan evaluation. First, Brown placed squarely on the shoulders of the school
board the burden of proving the adequacy of a particular plan to bring
United States v. Amite County, Civil No. 3983(j) (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v.
School Bd. of Richmond County, Civil No. 224-69-R (E.D. Va. 1969); McFerren v. County
Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Civil No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn. 1969) (plan invalidated
by McRae, J., Jan. 1970, on the grounds, inter alia, of racial motivation for the use of the
sex separation device and failure of defendant-school board to sustain the burden of
proof).
The plans submitted in these cases employ sex separation to varying degrees and in
different ways. For instance, in St. James approximately 70% of the students are in all-boys
and all-girls schools, in Concordia nearly all of the students in the system are separated
by sex; in Lincoln only 480 students are separated, in St. Tammany approximately 3300
students are separated; in Concordia all grades are separated, in Lincoln only the seventh
grade is separated; in Carrollthe separation proceeds in phases-a few grades per year, in
Catahoula the separation is at the option of the school board. The plans are complicated
formulations the details of which need not be explored. Suffice it to say that each plan
involves some separation by sex in the public school system.
The Fifth Circuit has pretermitted the question of the validity of the use of sex separation several times, see, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, F.2d - (5th Cir. Dec. 1, 1969); United States v. Hinds County, - F.2d - (5th Cir. Nov. 7,
1969), and, without ruling on the sex-separation issue, has given approval for the 1969-70
school year to a plan employing sex separation, see United States v. Amite County, Nos.
28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 1969) (unreported order of 3-judge panel).
Apparently, the use of sex separation in southern schools as a reaction to desegregation
is not a new idea. In 1957, Tennessee passed a law authorizing school boards to "provide
separate schools for persons of the male sex and persons of the female sex." TENN. LAWS
1957, ch. 98 § 1. This law was enacted to "dull the edge of school desegregation." McCauley, Be It Enacted: The Legislative Record, in WrrH AtL DEBERATE SPmm 141 (D.
Shoemaker ed. 1957). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D.
La. 1969).
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about equal educational opportunities, 5 and subsequent decisions
have demanded even more. "The burden on a school board today
is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises to work now."' 6 Second, the very fact that a board has allowed time to pass without taking steps toward compliance with the
mandate of the 1955 Brown decision renders any plan submitted immediately suspicious.' 7 Third, in assessing the effectiveness of a school
desegregation plan, a significant variable is the availability to a school
board of an alternative course of action. At the very least, when potentially "more promising courses of action" exist as an alternative
to the board's proposal, a heavy burden of proof is placed upon the
board to justify its preference for the method it has proposed.' 8 Finally, the court in Brown recognized that the "[f]ull implementation
of... [equal educational opportunity] may require solution of varied
local school problems."' 9 Yet the Court made explicit the requirement
that "a prompt and reasonable start toward fall compliance" be made
before any request for delay, required by these problems, would be
entertained.2 0 The Court specifically enumerated those problems which
may be taken into account when requests for delay are considered.
The courts may consider problems related to administration,
arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school
districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools on
a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations
2
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. '
Although this enumeration does not necessarily carry any negative
implication and eliminate other possible justifications for delay in
school desegregation, the Court has made its position on other justifications clear and has announced a standard by which justifications
for delay must be evaluated. Those justifications for delay which were
15 349 U.S. at 800 (1955).
16 Green v. New Kent County, 891 U.S. 430, 489 (1968).
17 . . . [W]e cannot ignore the passage of a substantial period of time since the
original declaration of the manifest unconstitutionality of racial practices such as
axe here challenged, the repeated and numerous decisions giving notice of such
illegality, and the many intervening opportunities heretofore available to attain
the equality of treatment which the Fourteenth Amendment commands the States
to achieve. These factors must inevitably and substantially temper the present import of such broad policy considerations as may have underlain, even in part, the
form of the decree ultimately framed in the Brown case.
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529-80 (1963).
See Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 480, 437-8 (1968); Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S.
268, 264-5 (1964); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 878 U.S. 688, 689 (1963).
18 Green v. New Kent County, 891 U.S. 480, 489 (1968).
19 849 U.S. at 299 (1955).
20 Id. at 800.
21 Id. at 300-1.
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enumerated in Brown are "not to be unnecessarily expanded in ap'22
plication.
The careful specification of factors relevant to a determination
whether any delay in complying fully and completely with
the constitutional mandate would be warranted demonstrated
a concern that delay not be conditioned upon insufficient
reasons or, in any event, tolerated unless it imperatively and
compellingly appeared unavoidable.23
The burden of proof is again placed on the school board, this time
to prove that a start toward full compliance has been made, that delay
is necessary, and that their proposed plan will meet those problems
which necessitate delay.24 In short, the use of a sex separation scheme
must be considered in light of the particular method of evaluation
demanded by the Court in determining the validity of school desegregation plans.
I.

SEX SEPARATION AS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Gunnar Myrdal, in his study of the race problem in America, asserts that the basic purpose behind all devices of segregation and discrimination is the desire to keep black men from white women, and,
to a lesser extent, white men from black women. 25 The ban on sex
22 Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963).
23 Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-1 (1955); cf. Watson v. Memphis, 373 US.
526, 533 (1963). See also Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). For the
Court's current position on the question of delay in school desegregation, see Alexander
v. Holmes County, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
25 This theory of color caste centering around the aversion to amalgamation determines ... the white man's rather definite rank order of the various measures of
segregation and discrimination against Negroes.... [T]he ban on intermarriage
and other sex relations involving white women and colored men takes precedence
before everything else.
G. MvRDAL, AN AMERICAN DIrEMMA 587 (2d ed. 1962); accord, Banks, Rank Order of Sensitivity to Discrimination, 15 Am. Soc. REv. 529 (1950); Edmunds, The Myrdalian
Thesis: Rank Order of Discrimination,15 PHYLON 297 (1954).
See Lonesome v. Maxwell, 123 F. Supp. 193, 202 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd sub nom., Dawson
v. Mayor, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE
OF PREJUDIcE 375-7, 467 (1954); J. DorLAD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TowN 134-72
(3d ed. 1957); B. DoYrE, THE ETIQuET-E OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE SouTim 63-67, 118, 152
(1937); J. GREENaERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 343-54 (1959); M. HALSEY, COLOR
BLIND 36-37 (1946); MYRDAL, supra, at 58, 60, 586-9; G. SIMPSON & J. YINcER, RACIAL AND
CULTURAL MINORrr
82-84, 261-2, 268-73 (1958). See generally City of Richmond v. Deans,
37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (housing desegregation contested because it
will lead to intermarriage); L. BAUGHMAN, SOUTHERN RAPE ComPL.Ex (1966); E. CLEAVER,
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relations between these groups, explains Myrdal, is at the core of all
such acts employed by whites, and, in fact, "[i]t is the end for which
26
the other restrictions are arranged as means."
Whether or not Myrdal's thesis is accepted, a consideration of his
assertions enables one to view the use of sex separation in a very different light. Admittedly, unlike many of the devices previously employed by southern school boards which perpetuated a dual system
based on race, the sex separation scheme does integrate the races. It
would, at least facially, appear to end the dual system based on race
which Brown forbids. Yet, despite the apparent end to racial separation provided by a sex separation scheme, it is important to note that
Brown not only called for an end to separation by race, but also dedared that "racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional." 27 Thus, while the sex separation device selectively integrates
the races, it may be racially discriminatory in that (1) it perpetuates
a vestige of the racial caste system-the separation of opposite-sex
members of the two races-and/or (2) this separation results in harms
similar to those recognized in Brown as inherent in a system of pure
racial segregation.
A. Racially Based Conduct and the Burden of Proof
Courts employ various criteria in order to scrutinize conduct by
a state or its agents in determining whether such conduct constitutes
racial discrimination. One judicial approach in examining conduct
which is challenged as racially discriminatory involves an inquiry into
whether there is a racial motive or purpose underlying such conduct. 28
SOUL ON ICE

155-210 (1968); H. GAnErry, BREEDING

DOWN

(196?); C.

HERNTON,

SEX AND

RACIsM IN AMERIcA (1965).

The appellants in the first brief filed before the Fifth Circuit on the issue of sex separation explain the use of the device as follows:
The superintendent's testimony makes plain what must become obvious to
black parents and their children if this plan goes into effect; to the school officials
of Concordia, black boys are simply not good enough to be in schools with white
girls, and black girls are simply not good enough to be in schools with white boys.
Brief for Appellants at 10, Smith v. Concordia Parish, No. 28342 (5th Cir., filed October
1969). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969).
The concern about sexual activities between the races is reflected in numerous statutes.
See GREFNBERG, supra at 344-54.
26 Mv s L, supra note 25, at 587.
27 349 U.S. at 298 (1955) (emphasis added).
28 See, e.g., Johnson v. Branch, 864 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008
(1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville Ed. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Downs v.
Ed. of Educ., 886 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 880 U.S. 914 (1965); Taylor v. Ed.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401, 429, 499-501 (D.D.C. 1967), afj'd sub nom,, Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
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If the use of sex separation by the school boards is found to be designed to perpetuate the separation of opposite-sex members of the
two races, an even heavier burden of proof than is normally required
in justifying a school desegregation plan may be imposed upon the
school board.
If the conduct of the school board is found to be racially based, it
is clear that the plans will be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny" 29
as are all classifications based on race. 30 In fact, a presumption of unconstitutionality of any measure involving racially-based classification,
when employed by a state, has been repeatedly advocated. 31 The rapid
invalidation of racial classifications in non-education areas 3 2 -invalidation ordered without regard to the establishment of a harm-which
followed the decision in the School DesegregationCases might be cited
(D.C. Cir. 1969); ef. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-5 (1965); Hall v. St. Helena Parish,
197 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1965).
In order to avoid becoming embroiled in the problem of whether the desire of school
boards to separate opposite-sex members of the two races is their "motive," or "purpose,"
this comment will use "motive," "purpose," "desire," and "basis" to indicate the forces
and goals motivating the school boards which are not beyond the scope of judicial inquiry.
Apparently the Fifth Circuit regards an inquiry into the motivation of the school boards
as a proper method of challenging the plans.
The difficult question presented on a motion to approve a plan for the assignment of students by sex, once the school district has been ordered to convert to a
unitary system, comes in determining whether the plan stems from educational
purposes as distinguished from racially discriminatory purposes. Stated differently,
is racial discrimination the motivation for the plan or does it have its basis in
educational purposes?
United States v. Amite County, Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 1969) (unreported
order of 3-judge panel).
29 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
30 The so-called "suspect classifications" include race, see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964); national ancestry, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); alienage, see, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); and, possibly, wealth, see, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US. 12 (1956), and religion, see, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
31 See, eg., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J. and Douglas, J.
concurring); Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. Rv. 157, 171-4, 179 (1963); cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32 (1959). See also Pollack, Racial
Discrimination and JudicialIntegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Rlv.
1 (1959).
32 See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (municipal auditoriums); Johnson v.
State of Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359
U.S. 533 (1959) (athletic contests); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege,
358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks and golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(intrastate buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Muir v.
Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (municipal amphitheater). For lower
court decisions to the same effect, see cases collected in T. EmrasoN, D. HABa & N. DoRSEN, POLITICAL AND Civit RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1678 (3d ed. 1967).
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for the proposition that such a presumption is, in fact, operative. 33
However, recent cases before the Supreme Court which have involved
acially-based ,classifications have not been summarily dealt with
through the use of any form of a per se rule or a presumption of unconstitutionality. 34 Rather, the test used in the context of "suspect
classifications"- 5 such as racial classifications is very similar to that
used by the Court in the context of fundamental freedoms. 36 The
finding of a racially-based classification seems to reverse the burden
of proof with the proponent of the questioned conduct required to
carry a "very heavy burden of justification" 37 if the scrutinized conduct is to be saved from invalidation as contrary to the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment. This test may be termed the "necessity
test." As it was described in another context:
There is involved here an exercise of the state police power
which trenches upon the constitutionally protected freedom
from invidious official discrimination based on race. Such a
law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest,
bears a heavy burden of justification... and will be upheld
only if is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the
accomplishment of a permissible state policy.38
Establishing that the plans are racially based is admittedly a difficult task, since statements indicating racial desires are seldom if ever
voluntarily and openly made by those charged with official responsibility. Relevant direct proof, if available, may be presented at the
trial court level to establish the racial desires behind the use of the
sex separation device. Appellate courts have taken judicial notice of
the patterns of social behavior between the races,39 and judges have even
been known to express their opinions on the matter.40 There seems
33 The summary invalidation without a showing of harm might have been ordered
simply because no justification was demonstrated.
84 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184

(1964).
35 See note 80 supra.
36 See text following note 130 infra.
37 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).

38 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (emphasis added). See also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-9 (1963); cf. Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
39 See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 1962); Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F.
Supp. 847, 856 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
40 Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the intereference with his ar-

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 37:296

to be a prevailing tendency to scrutinize carefully conduct and classifications in areas where racial problems have been involved and to
imply a racial purpose or motive to suspicious conduct even when
one cannot be adduced by direct proof. Courts seem willing to consider conduct in the context in which it appears, taking into account
the habits and attitudes of those involved. 41 Relevant here is the fact
that the sex separation scheme is a new device not previously used in
the particular educational systems in question 42-a device which has
been abandoned as an educational tool even by some of its staunchest
supporters. 43 The use of a novel device is rendered even more suspicious when it follows in the wake of repeated efforts to secure equal
rights for blacks, efforts which have met with numerous obstacles. 44
It should be noted that courts have even been willing to invalidate,
absent sufficient justification, conduct which has been found-by
direct proof or implication-to have only a partial racial basis. For
instance, requirements that applicants to unions, 45 universities, 46 or
professional societies 47 furnish recommendations from present members of the organization or be referred by them may serve a valid
purpose-screening of applicants by the old members. They may,
however, be requirements which are intended to keep minority group
applicants from membership. Despite a partial valid purpose, the conduct may be unconstitutional because of a partial racial purpose, and
rangement there would be no cause for such [inter]marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
An unknown Virginia trial court judge cited in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
See also Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582, 585 (M.D. Tenn. 1952); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 83 So. 2d 20, 27-28 (Fla. 1955) (Terrell, J. concurring).
41 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-6 (1963); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268,
276-7 (1939); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 362-81 (E.D. La. 1963), aff1'd,
380 U.S. 145 (1965); Hall v. St. Helena Parish, 197 F. Supp. 649, 651-2 (E.D. La. 1961),
aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962). See note 44 infra.
42 Cf. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718, 720-2 (4th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 386 (ED. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969).
43 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1968, at 1 (Yale to admit undergraduate women); N.Y.
Times, Nov. 15, 1968, at 34 (Vassar will admit men); N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1968, at 8 (Sarah
Lawrence will admit men); N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1968, at 8 (Franklin & Marshall, Kenyon,
University of the South, and the College of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown will admit
women); N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1968, at 32 (Choate will merge with Rosemary Hall). See
also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (ED. La. 1969).
44 "Innumerable cases have clearly established the principle that under circumstances
...
where a history of racial discrimination exists, the burden of proof has been thrown
upon the party having the power to produce the facts." Chambers v. Hendersonville Ed.
of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966). See note 41 supra.
45 See, e.g., Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969).
46 See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962).
47 See, e.g., Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
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the organization "cannot salvage the invalidity of [the] requirement
by convincing. .. [the court] that it did not arise at least in part from
48
racial bases."
As applied to the case at hand, if the use of the sex separation scheme
is found-by direct proof or implication by the court-to be attributable totally or in part to a desire to keep opposite-sex members of
the two races apart, the school board will be required to sustain a
very heavy burden of justification, even higher than that normally
required to justify a plan, because of the existence of a racially discriminatory motive for the plan.
B. Racial Discrimination from Effect

As an alternative to the direct finding of a racially discriminatory
motive or purpose as a method of challenging conduct by the state
as contrary to the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth
amendment, conduct may be invalidated because of its effect. 49 In

particular, if the use of sex separation in school desegregation plans,
however innocuous it may appear, has racially discriminatory effects,
the plans will be held unconstitutional. One effect of the use of sex
separation is clearly the separation of black boys from white girls and
white boys from black girls. If it is determined that this situation results in a denial of equal educational opportunities, 0 the sex separation
may be unconstitutional because of its racially discriminatory effect,
whether or not this discrimination is a conscious purpose of the scheme.
Before engaging in any inquiry into the racially discriminatory
effects which may result from a system of sex separation in a racially
mixed school system, two initial presumptions must be stated. First,
it must be taken as a generally accepted principle of modem education that schools should be free of avoidable detriments in the form
of racial discrimination. This would seem to be the clear mandate
of Brown as well as the view of most educators. 51 Second, any assess48 Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969). See Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964).
49 See, e.g., Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 458 (1968); Brown v. Bd.of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Henry v. Clarksdale, 409 F.2d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 1969); Green v. School
Bd., 304 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1962); Northcross v. Bd.of Educ., 302 F.2d 818, 8234 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962); Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961);
cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-6 (1963); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
346-8 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-4 (1886); United States v. Louisiana,
225 F. Supp. 353, 362-3 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Hall v. St. Helena Parish,
197 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1965).
50 See text at notes 57-87 infra.
51 [I]t is the business of the school environment to eliminate, so far as possible, the
unworthy features of the existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes. It establishes a purified medium of action. Selection aims not only at sim-
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ment of the harmful effects engendered by a particular desegregation
plan on the individuals involved necessarily is difficult to quantify
and involves a great degree of uncertainty. 52 It is the duty of the courts
to examine in depth the possible effects of a plan in determining
53
whether it eliminates the inequalities forbidden by Brown.
The harms inherent in a racially separated school system are identified and explored in Brown and further illuminated by two cases
cited therein. 54 Although the harms generated by a system of racial
segregation are interrelated, the harms may be conveniently identified
for the purpose of discussion as (1) the psychological harm, (2) the
educational harm, and (3) the social harm. 55 A search for the detriments inherent in a sex separation scheme begins most profitably with
a consideration of the applicability of the harms identified in Brown
to the sex separation scheme. 56
plifying but at weeding out what is undesirable. Every society gets encumbered
with what is trivial, with dead wood from the past, and with what is positively
perverse. The school has the duty of omitting such things from the environment
which it supplies, and thereby doing what it can to counteract their influence in
the ordinary social environment. By selecting the best for its exclusive use, it
strives to reinforce the power of this best. As a society becomes more enlightened,
it realizes that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its
existing achievements, but only such as make for a better future society. The
school is its chief agency for the accomplishment of this end. . . . [I]t is the office
of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the
limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to come into living
contact with a broader environment.
J. DmwEY, DmIsoCACY AND EDUCATION 24 (1936).
52 Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HA-lv.
L. REv. 564, 595-6 (1965); accord, Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1960). See McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53 Fiss, supra note 52, at 588.
54 McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
55 Fiss, supra note 52, at 568-70.
56 The harmful effects of segregation, and particularly the psychological effects, have
been the subject of much discussion. In Brown, the Supreme Court used the authorities
listed in the widely-discussed "footnote 11" to support their strongest statements about
the effects of segregation. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-5 (1954). The Court's
use of the authorities in footnote 11 to support their conclusions about the harmful effects
of segregation has been criticized. Perhaps the best known criticism is Cahn, Jurisprudence,
30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1955). Cahn concentrates his criticism on the research of Kenneth
B. Clark whose work was cited by the Court in Brown. Id. at 159-68. It is interesting to
note that Cahn only challenges the methods used by Clark but never his conclusions and,
in fact, describes Clark's conclusions about the effects of segregation as "a fact of common
experience." Id. at 160. Even Cahn's criticism of Clark's methods is prefaced by a caveat"my reaction may be due to a lack of technical training in scientific psychology and psychological testing." Id. at 161. It appears that even the expert witnesses called by the defense
to testify in Brown "admitted, in one way or another, that racial segregation in the schools
does injure Negro children's personalities." Id. at 160 (emphasis in original). This comment will proceed on the assumption that, on the best evidence available, those harms
identified in Brown are the actual effects of racial segregation.
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1. The Psychological Harm. Separation of students in the public
school system solely on the basis of race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to [the black students'] status in the community that may
57
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.1
As recognized in Brown, segregation by race is a source of frustration,
feelings of inferiority, humiliation, and distortion to the minority
group. 58 These detrimental effects are compounded when the segregation has the sanction of law; for the policy of separation is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the black child. 59
[E]nforced segregation gives official recognition and sanction
to [ordinary, private expressions of prejudice], and thereby
enhances the effects of the latter in creating the awareness
of social status differences and feelings of inferiority. The
child who, for example, is compelled to attend a segregated
school may be able to cope with ordinary expressions of prejudice by regarding the prejudiced person as evil or misguided;
but he cannot readily cope with symbols of authority, the
full force of the authority of the State-the school or the
school board, in this instance-in the same manner. Given
both the ordinary expression of prejudice and the school's
policy of segregation, the former takes on greater force and
seemingly becomes an official expression of the latter. 60
If blacks perceive in a sex separation scheme a desire to keep black
boys from white girls and white boys from black girls,61 it can be argued
that a scheme of sex separation will produce psychological harms
similar to those inherent in race segregation. Black students, knowing,
57 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See also Packinghouse Workers v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1136-8 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
58 K. CLARK, PRJuDcE AND YouR Cnnm 39 (2d ed. 1963). See E. FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN
THE UNrrED STATES 674-81 (1949); PERSONALTY IN THE MAKING 136-40 (H. Witmer & R.
Kotinsky eds. 1952); Brameld, Educational Costs, in DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WE.FARE 45-46 (R. MacIver ed. 1949); Chein, What are the PsychologicalEffects of Segregation
Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INLr'L J. OPINION AND ARTrTuDE RIES. 229 (1949);
Deutscher & Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social
Science Opinion, 26 J. PsYCHOL. 259 (1948); Milner, Some Hypotheses Concerning the Influence of Segregation on Negro Personality Development, 16 PSYcHIATRY 291-7 (1953). See
generally MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 640-63. Contra, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551
(1896).
59 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See CLARK, supra note 58, at 63.
60 The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science
Statement, 37 MINN. L. REv. 427, 433 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Brown Appendix]. This
document, drafted and signed by 32 sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists who have worked in the field of American race relations, was an appendix to
the Appellants' Brief in Brown.
61 See pp. 300-1 supra.
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assuming, or even suspecting the purpose of the school boards--to
keep members of one race from opposite-sex members of the other
race-may experience the same or similar psychological effects as
those generated by outright race separation. Surely they can glean
an awareness of the school board's desires as a result of their former
experiences with segregation and with the attitudes of the dominant
whites toward school desegregation. Moreover, this scheme, like race
segregation, has the sanction of the law in the form of school board
approval thus lending governmental prestige to the sex separation
analogous to the governmental approval found in race segregation.
2. The Educational Harm. Closely related to the psychological
harm resulting from enforced racial segregation are the educational
harms. The Court in Brown recognized this aspect of the problem:
A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency
to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
62
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
The educational success of a student is closely related to his psychological state. Segregation causes a reaction of defeatism and a lowering
of personal ambitions.6 3 This is, in turn, reflected in a lowering of
pupil morale and educational aspirations with the ultimate result
being an impairment of "the ability of the child to profit from the
educational opportunities provided him."6 4 If one accepts the proposition that black children are psychologically harmed by the sex
separation scheme,65 it is a corollary that educational harms will likewise result. The two seem to be intimately intertwined, and the proof
of one would in all probability, as in Brown, be the proof of the other.66
There is yet another aspect to the educational harms inherent in
racial segregation which must be considered in the context of sex
separation. Brown, and two cases decided four years earlier and cited
with approval in the Court's opinion, recognized that education which
excluded "a substantial and significant" segment of society"6 7 from
the educational atmosphere meant inferior education. In Sweatt v.
62 347 U.S. at 494 (1954) (emphasis added).
63 See CLARK, supra note 58, at 87-65; Brown Appendix, supra note 60, at 430; Fiss,

supra note 52, at 568-9. See also Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 126, 136-8
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
64 Brown Appendix, supra note 60, at 430.
65 See pp. 307-8 supra.
66 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
6T Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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68
the petitioner was denied admission to the state-supported
Painter,
University of Texas Law School because of a state law forbidding
admission of blacks to that school. Although he was offered, but refused, enrollment in a separate law school newly established by the
state for blacks, the Court held, mainly on the basis of an inequality
of facilities in violation of the "separate but equal" doctrine,6 9 that
the equal protection clause "requires that petitioner be admitted to
the University of Texas Law School." 70 The Court's reasoning in
finding an inequality in education is significant and was incorporated
into Brown. After recognizing that a racially segregated school denied
the student "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school," 7' 1 the Court concluded that, absent "a substantial and significant segment of society
[i.e. whites] the education offered the segregated black student was
not equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the all-white
school.7 2 In McLaurin v. Oklahoma7 3 a black citizen of Oklahoma
was admitted to the state-supported graduate school of the University
of Oklahoma. He was, pursuant to a state law requiring that, black
students in higher education be educated on a segregated basis, assigned to a seat in each classroom in a row specified for black students
and assigned to special tables in the library and cafeteria. As in Sweatt,
the conduct was declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws. The Court stated: "Such restrictions impair and
inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussion and exchange views
with other students, and, in general to learn his profession." 74
The Court in Brown found that the educational benefits, which
are derived from learning in a racially integrated context, were absent in the case of race separation and based its mandate, at least in
part, upon the absence of "the interplay of ideas and the exchange
of views ' 75 in race segregation which had been similarly found missing in Sweatt and McLaurin. Just as students can gain new ideas,
different approaches to subject matter, and varying attitudes from
education in a racially mixed school, exposure to the opposite-sex
members of one's own race and the other race in the learning context

68 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
69 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
70 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
71 Id. at 634.
72

Id.

73 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
74 Id. at 641. See Fiss, supra note 52, at 569-70.
75 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). See Fiss, supra -note52, at 569-70. See also
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); Brameld, supra note 58, at 45.
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may result in the same educational benefits, and these benefits may
be denied by a sex separation scheme3 6
3. The Social Harm. Overlapping the psychological and educational harms, the existence of the social harms in racial separation
77
was dearly enunciated in McLaurin and approved in Brown:
The removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily abate
individual and group predilections, prejudices and choices.
But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant
of his opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students
78
on his own merits.
Segregation imposes upon the individual a distorted sense of the social realities.7 9 Not only does the perpetuation of social barriers lead
to a blockage of communication and interaction between the racial
groups which in turn increases mutual suspicions, distrust, and hostility, but it also reinforces stereotypes and perpetuates negative attitudes toward the members of the other group. s0 Also, social barriers
may mean educational detriments in the sense of lost opportunities
for contact with members of the dominant group.8 ' Courts have taken
judicial notice of these social barriers between the races, 82 and the
Court in Brown, when read with McLaurin, seems to recognize the
perpetuation of the social barriers between the races as a harm result8
ing from racial segregation. 3

If social barriers are perpetuated by race separation, they may be
analogously perpetuated in a scheme which, although seemingly neu76 See Dale, Co-Education: The Verdict of Experience-Part 1I.-A Qualitative Approach, 35 BRIT. J. OF EDuC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196-7 (1965); Taylor, Coeducation for the Colleges: Why? How? and When?, 52 LIBERAL EDUc. 271 (1966).
If the sex segregated high schools were to result in an inferior educational opportunity for the high school students, then this would merely serve to accentuate
the handicap of the disadvantaged education that the Negro children have previously received.
McFerren v. County Board of Educ. of Fayette County, Civil No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn.
1969) (United States Government's Objections to Plan).
77 347 U.S. at 493 (1954).
78 McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637, 641-2 (1950).
79 See Brown Appendix, supra note 60, at 432; Dale, supra note 76, at 197; Kolesnik,
Should Students Be Separated by Sex? 63 CATH. EDUc. Rv. 73, 79 (1965); Taylor, supra
note 76, at 271; cf. N. McCLUSKEY, CATHOLIC VIEwroIrr ON EDuCATION 98 (1962).
80 See CLARx, supra note 58, at 39; T. NEWCOmB, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 572-615 (1950); E.
SucHMAN, J. DEAN, 8=R. WLLIAMS, JR., DESEGREGATION: SOME PROPOSITIONS AND RESEARCH
SUGGESTIONS 11-20, 47-56 (1958); Brameld, supra note 58, at 46-47; Brown Appendix, supra

note 60, at 432; Milner, supra note 58, at 291-7.
81 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
82 See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 1962); Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F.
Supp. 847, 856 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
83 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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tral on its face, separates black boys from white girls and white boys
from black girls. Viewed in this light, sex separation may lead to a
blockage of communication, intensifying misunderstandings, distrust,
and, most importantly stereotypes-the very harms identified in Brown.
Attempts, by the courts, to regulate social barriers between oppositesex members of the white and black races and to interfere with manifestations of those barriers, such as the sex separation scheme, might
be seen as an attempt to regulate attitudes. In another context, it was
said:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties
of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of
both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly
or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially,
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon
the same plane.84
Not only has Plessy v. Ferguson,8 5 the source of this argument and
the "separate but equal" doctrine, been thoroughly discredited, but
it may be said that attempting to reach attitudes which forbid contacts between black men and white women and white men and black
women is no longer beyond the powers nor outside the duties of the
courts. In satisfying the requirement of dismantling a still-functioning
dual educational system and of converting "to a unitary non-racial system-lock, stock, and barrel,"8 6 school boards may be permitted and
even required to dispel attitudes such as these. The import of Brown
is clear:
School boards . . . operating state-compelled dual systems
were . .. clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
7
root and branch.

II.

SEX SEPARATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

Whether or not the creation of separate schools for boys and girls
in a school desegregation plan is found to be racially based or to have
84 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-2 (1896).
85 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
86 United States v. Jefferson County, 372 F.2d 836, 878 (5th Cir. 1966), adopted en banc,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). See United States v. Montgomery
County, 395 US. 225, 230 (1969); cf. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
See also Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232-4 (1964).
87 Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-8 (1968) (emphasis added).
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a racially discriminatory effect, and is thereby found to be a mere facade
for racial discrimination, the sex separation scheme results in a clear
classification-boys and girls placed in their educational environment
solely on the basis of their sex. Sex separation may be viewed as a form
of sex discrimination which, by separating female students as a class
and denying them the benefits of equal educational opportunities,
may be contrary to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
requirements. s8
The status and problems of the woman in America present a curious parallel to those of the black. Women, like blacks, are characterized by a high social visibility expressed in physical appearance,
dress, and patterns of behavior setting them apart as a distinct "dass."8' 9
Besides a high degree of visibility, women and blacks also share the
dubious distinction of being the victims of very similar arguments
used by the dominant group to justify the inferior position accorded
88 The fourteenth amendment forbids classifications by the states or their agents, discriminating against some and favoring others, which do not bear a reasonable relationship to the promotion of a valid public purpose. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
cf. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
The discussion of sex separation in school desegregation plans may be viewed as a bifurcated problem. The plans may be viewed as racially discriminatory conduct. See text at
notes 25-87 supra. By that theory, the black children are the "minority group" to be
considered as victims of any inherent harms. However, the plans may also be viewed as
classification on the basis of sex. Although, as will be discussed below, boys and girls are
both classified, for the purposes of this discussion, girls, the numerical minority, will be
considered the "minority group."
Including women as a class under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection requirements would seem to necessitate a showing that (1) women are set apart as a class, (2) they
are harmed in some way by this delineation, and (3) the classification is unjustified. See
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). As to the necessity of showing a "purpose" to

discriminate, see Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1147, 1150-5 (1966). Recently,
sex exclusion at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville was declared unconstitutional.
We hold ... that on the facts of this case these particular plaintiffs have been ...
denied their constitutional right to an education equal with that offered men at
Charlottesville and that such discrimination on the basis of sex violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kirstein v. University of Virginia, Civil No. 220-69-R (E.D. Va. 1969) (unreported order of
3-judge panel-Feb. 6, 1970).
89 In every society there are at least two groups of people, besides the Negroes, who
are characterized by high social visibility expressed in physical appearance, dress,
and patterns of behavior, and who have been "suppressed." We refer to women
and children. Their present status, as well as their history and their problems in
society, reveal striking similarities to those of the Negroes.
MYRaD., supra note 25, at 1073.
See A. MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS M=m: THE FALLACY OF RAcE 181 (4th ed.

1964); Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. REv. 723,
727-8 (1935); Hacker, Woman as a Minority Group, 30 SocuL FoRc.s 60, 65 (1951);

Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34
GEo. WASH. L. REv, 232, 233-5 (1965).'
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them, including inferior intelligence, scarcity of geniuses, freedom
in instinctual gratifications, and emotionalismY0 Both groups were
assigned a "place" in society, whether it be the field or the home, and
were barred from education, suffrage, certain jobs, and political office. 91 Most significantly, the actions of the dominant groups toward
both blacks and women were thought to be in the best interest of
92
the subordinate groups.
The history of the separate treatment of women in the eyes of the law,
or more properly the sex classification, begins with the Supreme Court
decision in Muller v. Oregon.93 A 1903 Oregon statute, providing that
no female shall work in certain establishments more than ten hours a
day, was held not to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment and
a valid exercise of the police power. However, the legislation was also
sustained as a valid method of expressing the public interest in preserving "the well-being of the race" 94 by protecting women's health needs
and the exercise of her maternal function.
[S]he is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation
designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like
legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained .... [H]er physical structure and a proper discharge

of her maternal function-having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to
protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. 95
From this language has been extracted the principle that sex is a valid
basis for classification, a principle which is often relied upon without
regard to the purpose of the conduct involving sex classification or the
reasonableness of the relationship between the use of the sex classification and that purpose. 96 The language of Muller has been utilized in
subsequent decisions to support such measures as a Michigan law pre97
venting most females from becoming licensed bartenders, a Florida
enactment excluding women from jury service unless they affirmatively
0

See MONTAGU, supra note 89, at 181, MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 1077.

91 Id.
92 Id.

93 208 U.S. 412 (1908). On the history of the sex classification, see Murray & Eastwood,
supra note 89, at 236-8.
94 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
95 Id.

96 L. Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination, in WOMEN AND
THE LAw 154 (1969); accord, Murray & Eastwood, supra note 89, at 239.

97 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S, 464 (1948).
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volunteer to serve,9 8 exclusion of women from state-supported institutions in Texas, 99 and a variety of other examples of sex classification. 100
It should be noted that the sex classification-unequal treatment
of women in the eyes of the law-seems to be disappearing.' 0 ' However,
women appear to remain the victims of discrimination based on sex,
especially in the fields of education 10 2 and employment, 10 3 and language
reminiscent of Muller still appears. 0 4
Including women as a class under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment will not be aided by a resort to the inconclusive
legislative history of that amendment. 105 It seems clear, however, that,
whatever the history of the enactment of the amendment, the guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment are not static and may well be found to
apply to this class.
98 Hoyt v. Florida, 868 US. 57 (1961).

99 Alfred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 517 (1960);
Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
100 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1987); Radice v. New York,
264 U.S. 292 (1924); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S.
878 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914).
101 As a result of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, women are now entitled to equal payment
for equal time worked, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964); "sex" was included along with race,
color, religion, and national origin in the equal employment oportunity provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (1964); as a result of presidential
order, discrimination against women in federal employment is forbidden, U.S. CIVIL
SEaV. COMr-r'N FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 718-6-713-8 (1963). See Abbott v. Mines,
411 F2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1969); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408-9 (N.D. Ala. 1966);
Murray & Eastwood, supra note 89, at 232-3.
102 Professional schools, such as architecture and medicine, apply quotas. Hacker, supia
note 89, at 62. In the last thirty years, women have been receiving a decreasing proportion
of master's degrees and doctorates resulting, to a great extent, from the unequal
distribution of stipends and fellowships to women. On the Graduate School Payroll,
CAREERs TODAY (Jan. 1969). See PREsEDENT'S CoM. ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN
WOMEN 11-13 (1963) [hereinafter cited as PRESMENT'S COMM.].
103 The number of charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
under Title VII have demonstrated that race and sex discrimination are by far the most
prevalent forms of discrimination in employment. In fiscal 1966, for example, the charges
filed with EEOC by category were: race or color 53.1%; sex 34%; unspecified 9.9%;
national origin 2.1%; religion 1.4%. EEOC Report of Compliance Activities, BNA FAIR
EMPLOYmENT PRACTIcEs 431:61. See Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law
III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAsTINGs L.J.
305 (1968).
104 Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and
protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life
formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center
of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible
for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman
should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines
that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities.
Hoyt v. Florida, 868 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961).
105 See Loving v. Virginia, 888 US. 1, 9-10 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 489 (1954).
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When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is
further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out
that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have
been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed
solely against discrimination due to a "two-class theory"-that
is, based upon differences between "white" and Negro. 106
The harms which are inflicted upon the female student may be best
illustrated by again resorting to a parallel to the harms found in race
separation. First, psychological effects similar to those found in race
separation may also exist in sex separation. Although little reasearch
has been done directly on sex segregation, no systematic empirical study
or theoretical article has asserted that a segregated human being benefits
thereby. 10 7 There is, moreover, persuasive evidence that the effects of
involuntary segregation are not a function of the particular characteristics of the subordinate group, but rather these effects are generated
by the characteristics of the segregation situation itself. 08 Personality
damage associated with segregation is found among all segregated
10 9
children regardless of "racial, nationality, or religious background."'
In fact, it has been noted that women's overt reactions to sex discrimination are even stronger than those manifested by other minorities when
faced with discrimination."x0 Moreover, the conduct in the sex separation situation has the sanction of law in the form of school board
approval thus lending governmental prestige to the sex distinction
analogous to the governmental approval found in race segregation."'
In short, there is evidence pointing to the conclusion that the same
psychological detriments, alleged to harm the segregated black, may
also harm the separated female.
Second, if one accepts the proposition that female students are psychologically harmed by sex separation, it seems that educational harms
will likely result also." 2 As in the case of psychological effects, the

educational harms associated with segregation seem not to be restricted
to any particular group, social or economic, nor are they confined to any
particular racial, nationality, or religious background."13 Once again,
106 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1961).

107

CLARKu,
supra note 58, at 63.

108 Id.
109 Id. See Brown Appendix, supra note 60, at 430.
110 Hacker, supra note 89, at 61.

ll See text at notes 59-60 supra. See also Murray & Eastwood, supra note 89, at 240.
But see Wechsler, supra note 31, at 33.
112 See p. 308 supra.

113 CLARK, supra note 58, at 63. See Brown Appendix, supra note 60, at 430.
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the sex separation may-affect the female, this time in retarding educational development, as race segregation affects the black. Of course,
any educational benefits to be derived from a heterogeneous educational
atmosphere are lost to the female when separated from her male
contemporaries in the learning process. Finally, if social barriers are
perpetuated by race separation, they are analogously perpetuated in
sex separation; the sexes are kept apart resulting in an atmosphere
which inadequately prepares one for the realities of social life in a world
14
of two sexes.
Although the use of the "necessity test" has been advocated in the
context of sex classification, 115 if the sex separation schemes are viewed
-- devoid of any racial overtones-as involving only a distinction based
on sex, the test which will, in all probability, be employed will be the
so-called "reasonable relation test."
[C]lassification cannot be made arbitrarily .

...

[but] must

always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonableand
just relation to the act in respect to which the classification
is proposed...

116

Here, the objective is dearly equal educational opportunities, 117 and
the question will be: Does the sex separation bear a reasonable relation
to the achievement of equal educational opportunities?
The Supreme Court has never found a law or administrative action
based on a classification according to sex to be unconstitutional. 118 Yet,
it may be that sex separation in school desegregation plans-which sets
women apart as a class without any apparent justificationll---presents
an ideal situation for a challenge to the validily and viability of Muller
and its disciples.
114 See Dale, supra note 76, at 197; Kolesnik, supra note 79, at 79; Taylor, supra note
76, at 271.
115 While the Supreme Court has not explicitly determined whether equal protection rights of women should be tested by this rigid standard, it is difficult to find
any reason why adult women, as one of the specific groups that compose
humanity, should have a lesser measure of protection than a racial group.
United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14 (D. Conn. 1968).
116 Gulf, Colorado 8&Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897). See McGowan v.
Maryland, 266 U.S. 420, 425-6 (1961); Hernandez v. Texas, 247 U.S. 475, 478 (1954);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-3 (1942). See also Fiss, supra note 52, at 579.
117 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 247 US. 483 (1954).
118 And, it further appearing to the Court that this is the first federal suit of
which we are aware brought to test the constitutionality of enforced separation
of the sexes in a state educational institution, and that the question of constitutionality is novel and difficult . .. .
Kirstein v. University of Virginia, Civil No. 220-69-. (E.D. Va. 1969) (unreported
order of 3-judge panel, Sept. 30, 1969). See note 120 infra.
119 See pp..219-26,infra.
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Early and definitive court pronouncement, particularly by
the U.S. Supreme Court, is urgently needed with regard to the
validity under the 5th and 14th amendments of laws and
official practices discriminating against women, to the end that
the principle of equality become firmly established in constitu120
tional doctrine.
III. SEX

SEPARATION AS LIMITING FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Sex separation in school desegregation plans may be viewed as an
unconstitutional restriction of the freedom of association,21 ' an approach advanced by Professor Wechsler of Columbia University Law
School:
For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by
state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimination at all.
Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a
denial that impinges in the same way on any groups or races
22
that may be involved.
This freedom of association, carried from the first amendment to the
states through the fourteenth, 2 3 may be violated by the separation of
students from the opposite sex of his own race and from opposite-sex
members of the other race. School authorities, as agents of the state,
may not violate the basic constitutional right of freedom to associate
in the performance of their ministerial function regarding schools
any more than they can deny equal educational opportunities 24
120 PREsPDENT'S Commar., supra note 102, at 45; accord, Murray & Eastwood, supra note
89, at 238. If the sex separation schemes are judged invalid, viewing the case simply as
sex classification in the public schools devoid of any racial overtones, the decision could
have broad ramifications for all separate education in public school systems. In the field
of education, the sex separation in New York public schools has been challenged, and a
settlement reached, by a girl seeking admission to a previously all-boys high school. N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1969, at 21. The exclusion of women from the undergraduate roles at the
University of Virginia at Charlottesville has been successfully challenged. Kirstein v.
University of Virginia, Civil No. 220-69-R (E.D. Va. 1969) (unreported order of 3-judge
panel, Feb. 6, 1970).
121 "The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of
Rights.. . . Yet, the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of these
rights." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
122 Wechsler, supra note 31, at 34. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896)
(Harlan, J. dissenting).
123 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Harlan, J. concurring); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
124 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481-6 (1965); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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The Supreme Court has recently decided two important cases on
interracial association which are relevant to this consideration of sex
separation schemes in school desegregation plans as limitations on the
freedom of association. In McLaughlin v. Florida,25 the Court declared
unconstitutional a Florida criminal statute prohibiting an unmarried
interracial couple from habitually living in and occupying the same
room in the nighttime when no other statute penalized precisely the
same conduct when engaged in by members of the same race. In Loving
v. Virginia,126 the Court held that the Virginia anti-miscegenation law
was a denial of equal protection of the laws and, thus, unconstitutional
as a violation of the fourteenth amendment. By declaring prohibitions
on interracial cohabitation and miscegenation to be unconstitutional,
the Court is arguably protecting the fundamental freedom of association
when it is denied along racial lines.
If a desire to keep opposite-sex members of the two races apart is
found in the context of sex separation, 12 7 the plans may have as their
purpose separation of the races similar to the separation now declared
unconstitutional. Whatever their purpose, the schemes might be said
to have the effect of extending the now unconstitutional bans on interracial contacts. "The [fourteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated
as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.' 28 The schemes
may be seen as another "ingeniusly or ingenuously"'' 2 9 contrived method
of reaching a prohibited result through conduct which appears neutral
on its face. "It is a familiar principle that conduct which in usual
situations the law protects may become unlawful when part of a
scheme to reach a prohibited result."' 8 0
If the use by a school board of sex separation in school desegregation
plans is viewed as conduct infringing upon the fundamental freedom
of association guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, the test which
the court will apply will in all probability be that traditionally used in
evaluation of conduct affecting fundamental interests. The test-which
may, for convenience, be called "strict scrutiny"-is probably best
explained by the words of the Court:
These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as precious
in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions....
Because the First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
125 379 U.S. 184 (1964).

126 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
127 See pp. 300-1 supra.
128 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
129 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
130 Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713, 715 (1927).
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to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity. 131
Although valid reasons for state interference with the freedom of
association may exist,132 surely any encroachment upon a fundamental
freedom must carry with it a heavy burden of justification as the Court
has declared in at least one case: "We do not now conceive of any circumstances wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights
133
in these fields."'
IV. Ti DEFENSE OF SEX SEPARATION
Since it seems that by whichever test-"necessity,"'134 "reasonable
relation,"'135 or "strict scrutiny"13 6-the courts choose to evaluate the
constitutionality of sex separation in school desegregation plans, justifications of such plans will continue to be relevant, the next inquiry must
concern possible defenses for sex separation. It is important to recall
that in the context of a school desegregation plan school boards must
satisfy a heavy burden of proof in persuading the courts that sex separation meets the requirements of Brown.137 This discussion will include
those defenses which have actually been advanced by school boards
defending plans before district courts as well as those which might be
advanced in the future.
A. The Equal Application Defense
The first defense which has been advanced for sex separation is the
familiar claim that equal application is a valid defense for an act
involving classification. Those who support this view argue that a
system of sex separation such as that proposed by the school boards in
the South affects whites as much as it affects blacks and affects boys as
much as it affects girls. Just as detrimental psychological effects may be
131 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,

460-1 (1958).
132 See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 463-6 (1958). The educational process is replete with examples of limitations on the
freedom to associate. For instance, often a student may not be allowed to select the
particular public school which he wishes to attend even if his friends attend that school;
nor may he select classes with his friends when the school employs a "tracking system."
Unfortunately, a clear principle delineating the permissible limitations on the freedom
to associate in the school context has not arisen from the cases.
33 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 231, 251 (1957); see NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460-1 (1958).
134 See text at notes 29-38 supra.
135 See text at notes 115-6 supra.
136 See text following note 130 supra.

137 See pp. 298-300 supra.
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produced in the subordinate group, blacks or women, 3 8 segregation
affects the dominant group. 3 9 Although it may be said that black boys
are kept from white girls, so too are white boys kept from white girls
with the resulting educational consequences and social barriers. 140
If racial discrimination is found in sex separation schemes, through
a finding of a racial basis or racially discriminatory effects, the fact of
equal application, reflecting a regression to the now discredited doctrine
of "separate but equal," would seem to be irrelevant. "[T]he fact of
equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy
burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race."' 41 If the
problem is viewed as an instance of pure classification based on sex,
absent a racial element, at least in the case of a statute, equal application
is only a preliminary inquiry. "Judicial inquiry under the Equal
Protection Clause... does not end with a showing of equal application
among the members of the class defined by the legislation. The courts
must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn
in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose .
*...
,142 If the
conduct is viewed simply as sex classification, the equal application does
not serve as a defense but rather leads back to the "reasonable relation
test" and leaves the question unanswered. Of course, it is an anomaly
to assert that equal application justifies encroachment upon a fundamental freedom.
B. The Temporary Step Defense
Another justification which has been advanced in defense of a plan
of sex separation runs as follows: "The school board offers this proposal
only as a transitory measure designed to ease the conversion to a unitary
system.' 1 43 Admitting that race and racial attitudes are being taken into
account in the formulation of the plan, the proponents of this view
maintain that integrating the races by sex will help dispel many of the
138 See pp. 307-8 and text following note 106 supra.
139 See CL~a, supra note 58, at 40; MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 643-4; Black, supra note
52, at 428, Brameld, supra note 58, at 44.
;40 See pp. 308-11 supra.
141 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
142 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
143 Smith v. St. Tammany Parish, 302 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. La. 1969).
In order to obtain better community acceptance of such a drastic change ...
in
its school system, the St. James Parish School Board and its staff strongly believes
[sic] that separation of the sexes at the high school and upper elementary levels
is the best plan to offer the community at this time.
Banks v. St. James Parish, Civil No. 16173 (E.D. La. 1969) (School Board's Proposed Amendments to Plan) (emphasis added). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp. 244,
249 (E.D. La. 1969) ("The School Board has advanced this plan as an experiment.")
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stereotypes, misunderstandings, and hatreds which are inherent in racial
segregation, 1 4 and, thus, total integration will be easier when it comes
some time in the future. Possibly, after the races are integrated along
sex lines, a step in the right direction, many of the attitudes about the
sexual prowess of black boys and black girls which exist in the racially
segregated context will be erased, then sex separation will become unpopular on its own, and it will die out without judicial intervention.
This is a case, the argument runs, "where the State has done as much as
45
it can as fast as it can."'
This justification must be squared, however, with the clearly pronounced policy of the Supreme Court against delay repeated with
increased emphasis numerous times since Brown first called for desegregation "with all deliberate speed."' 46 For example, in its last terms the
Court stated:
[C]ontinued operation of segregated schools under a standard
of allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer
constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this
Court, the obligation of every school district is to terminate
dual systems at once and to operate hereafter only unitary
schools. 147
Constitutional rights, such as the right to equal educational opportunities, are present rights, and so they were even under the now discarded
doctrine of "separate but equal."'148 Delays have not been allowed in
non-education areas.' 49 The passage of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act'6 0 and other governmental efforts in the area of desegregation may
be interpreted as a mandate for a stepped-up pace in enforcing desegre144
145

See text at note 77-83 supra.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194

(1964).
349 U.S. at 301 (1955).
Alexander v. Holmes County, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). For reaction to this case reflecting
some of the justifications discussed in this comment, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1969, at 1.
The policy of immediate desegregation enunciated in Alexander can be seen in numerous
cases decided since Brown. See Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438-9 (1968);
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 199 (1965); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965);
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-20
(1958); cf. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1963).
148 See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
149 See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (transportation); Bhd. of
Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (employment rights and union representation); Schnell v. Davis, 336 US. 933 (1949) (voting); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S.
704 (1930) (racial zoning of property).
150 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (1964).
146
147
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gation."5 I

It seems dear that temporary steps are no longer enough:
'15 2
"delays in desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable."
C. The Community Hostility Defense
Admittedly, a school board in the South will often encounter a
significant amount of community hostility as a reaction to any attempts
at school desegregation. It has been asserted that community hostility
to school desegregation and the results which flow from that hostility,
such as flight by white children from the public school system, 5 3 are a
valid reason to integrate the races along sex lines first and bring about
total integration later.'54 This argument, it should be noted, once again
admits that race and racial attitudes are being considered in the formulation of a plan, yet seeks to justify this fact.
Today, no less that fifty years ago, the solution to the problems growing out of race relations in the United States "cannot be promoted by
depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges."' 155
151 See Green v. New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 4334 (1968). "We read Title VI as a
congressional mandate for change--change in pace and method of enforcing desegregation."
United States v. Jefferson County, 372 F.2d 836, 852 (5th Cir. 1966), adopted erz banc, 380
F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
152 Bradley v. School Ed., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965). See Alexander v. Holmes County,
396 U.S. 19 (1969). On the use of educational devices which delay school desegregation,

see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D. D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noma., Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For a consideration of the use of sex separation as an
educational experiment, see pp. 323-6 infra.
153 Respondent's argument in this Court reveals its purpose. We are frankly told
in the Brief that without the transfer option it is apprehended that white
students will flee the school system altogether.
Monroe v. Ed. of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
This pairing method [sex separation] in the City of Bastrop will not cause
whites to move about seeking to flee predominantly Negro areas, thereby resegregating the schools.
United States v. Morehouse Parish, Civil No. 14429 (W.D. La. 1969) (School Board's
Proposed Plan). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1969, at 1.
154 In making a transition of this type, we have to consider the opinion of our
people, public opinion .

. .

. This problem will be difficult, but if we could have

the support of our public this would minimize the problems that we wil be
confronted with.
Record at 12, Banks v. St. James Parish, Civil No. 16173 (E.D. La. 1969) (testimony
of the Superintendent of Schools).
Mflou might say the acceptance of the public in the local community is a prime
factor in operating a school system, because unless you have public support, the
school system would not be able to operate very long.
Id. at 79.
It might make racial integration somewhat more palatable to those of the blindly
bigoted whose resistance is partly created by insecurity and fears regarding sex.
Levine, Coeducation-A Contributing Factor in Miseducation of the Disadvantaged, 46
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 126, 128 (1964).
See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish, 304 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969); Smith v.
St. Tammany Parish, 302 F. Supp. 106, 108 (E.D. La. 1969).
155 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1917). See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 6
(1958); cf. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 539 (1963).
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Hostility to constitutional precepts was expressly proscribed by Brown
as a valid justification for delay in school desegregation. "[I]t should go
without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot
be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."'155 As a
court determines the legitimacy of this suggested justification for the
sex separation plans, the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, uttered in
the face of massive resistance to school desegregation are relevant:
Local customs, however hardened by time, are not decreed in
heaven. Habits and feelings they engender may be counteracted and moderated. Experience attests that such local habits
and feelings will yield, gradually though this be, to law and
education. And educational influences are exerted not only by
explicit teaching. They vigorously flow from the fruitful exercise of the responsibility of those charged with political official power and from the almost unconsciously transforming
actualities of living under law. 157
D. The Defense from the Educators
Probably the most persuasive justification of sex separation schemes
comes from the educators. The fact that their defense of sex separation
originates in a context far removed from the realities of the segregated
South, 1s and has been articulated by the Catholic church in one form
and by the defenders of private all-boys and all-girls schools in another
form, gives the argument an aura of respectability. 59
16 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); accord, Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); Cooper v
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9 (1958).
157 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 25 (1958) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
158 Most of the research cited herein was done in all-white, middle class contexts and
is very limited in scope. The single exception to the all-white, middle class context seems
to be Levine, supra note 154. His conclusion is of particular interest.
To summarize, a coeducational classroom in low-income communities simultaneously encourages boys to act out scholastically disfunctional stereotypes and
increases the likelihood that they will experience competitive lack of success which
confuses their sexual identification and threatens their self-image.
Id. at 128.
159 This defense has been accepted in at least one case.
There is no objection to the assignment of school children to schools on the
basis of sex; no federal court has at any time claimed such an assignment to be
unconstitutional; and the government in this case does not enter objection to that
concept. As a matter of fact, "coeducation," the education of girls in the same
schools that boys also attend, has been regarded as a "modem phenomenon."
Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. VI, page 14. Historically the education of youths
was on the basis of separation of the sexes, and it was not until approximately
1900 that most public high schools were coeducational. According to good
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Pope Pius XI in his historic encyclical "The Christian Education of
Youth" defended sex separation in education and refers to coeducation
as "false" and "harmful" and based on "a deplorable confusion of ideas
that mistake a leveling promiscuity and equality for the legitimate
association of the sexes." He concludes: "there is not in nature itself,
which fashions the two [sexes] quite different in organism, in temperament, in abilities, anything to suggest that there can or ought to be
promiscuity, and much less equality, in the training of the two sexes."'I6 0
The Catholic defense of separate education, although based peripherally on other considerations,' 61 is primarily concerned with the
prevention of immorality and promiscuous behavior through the separation of the sexes during the educative process. Although the state may
have a legitimate interest in the prevention of promiscuity which it
manifests in the form of various sex laws, the basic premise-that
coeducation may be equated with promiscuity-is surely open to question. In any case, the countervailing advantages of coeducation may
outweigh the asserted danger of illicit behavior. 162
There has been surprisingly little empirical research done on the
psychological and educational merits and demerits of separate education,163 and most of it reveals inconclusive findings. 16 4 It seems relevant,
however, to consider the arguments advanced on both sides. Any court
evaluating a sex separation scheme, if it were to be true to the precedent
set by the Supreme Court's reliance on the opinion of social scientists
in Brown, must look to the educators' view.
In the context of private, secular schools it has been maintained that
the differential development, physically and mentally, of boys and girls
in the pre-adolescent and adolescent stages requires separate teaching
at a different pace in order to realize the fullest intellectual developwisdom of the ages. In any case, the concept embraces a philosophy that has not
been held contrary to the United States Constitution and must, therefore, be
approved.
United States v. Carroll County, Civil No. GC 6541-K (N.D. Miss. 1969) (Keady, Cj.).
The Fifth Circuit apparently would recognize the educational defense.
The court is reluctant to permit the use of such a plan except upon a finding
based on proof that the plan was devised and is to be promulgated for educational purposes only.
United States v. Amite County, Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 1969) (unreported
order of 3-judge panel).
160

Pope Pius XI, The ChristianEducation of Youth, in

FIVE GREAT ENCYCLICALS

56-57

(C. Tracy ed. 1939).
161 See generally McCLusKEY, supra note 79, at 96-99.
162 See text at notes 165-7 infra.
163 Levine, supra note 154, at 127; Kolesnik, supra note 79, at 73.
164 Fisher & Waetjen, An Investigation of the Relationship Between the Separation
by Sex of Eighth Grade Boys and Girls and English Achievement and Self-Concept, 59 J.
oF ED. Rrs. 409, 412 (1966); Kolesnik, supra note 79, at 75; Levine, supra note 154, at 127.
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ment of each group. 6 5 In separate education fewer discipline problems
are said to arise because the tendency of boys to "show-off" for girls
does not exist.' 6 6 Some research has also revealed less pressure and
competition when the sexes are separated resulting in more cooperation,
67
motivation, and participation by the separated groups.
Other studies, however, employing similar research techniques, have
found no increased intellectual development under sex-separated education when the differential physical and mental development of the two
sexes are taken into account.' 68 Behavior may also be better in the
coeducational environment as boys try to achieve status in the eyes of
girls through school-oriented behavior rather than subversion of the
educational atmosphere. 169
In view of the inconclusive nature of most of the research in this -area,
before accepting the educational values of separate education
court,
a
as a justification for sex separation in school desegregation plans, would
have to see more than the present empirical research reveals.
Probably the most compelling defense of the use of sex separation in
school desegregation plans is one which has not yet been advanced in the
proceedings which have passed on the validity of the device. It combines, in an educator's argument, all of the defenses discussed above and
runs as follows: There is a large disparity between the educational
levels of black and white children in the South. 70 Despite all efforts
which have been made to close this gap, the proper method has not been
found. 71 ' Because separate education has not yet been disproved as an
advantageous method for enhancing the educational progress of disadvantaged students, the argument runs, give the sex separation scheme
a trial as an educational tool, a way to close the educational gap between
the races, before passing on it as a tool of desegregation. It does, after
all, integrate the races and afford an opportunity to avoid the hostility
which would be encountered by integration of the sexes. Even "freedom165 See McCLusKEY, supra note 79, at 97-98; Dale, supra note 76, at 206; Kolesnik,
supra note 19, at 75; Levine, supra note 154, at 127.
166 See Dale, supra note 76, at 201-2; Herman & Criscuolo, Sex Grouping, 77 THE
INsTRUCrOR 97, 99 (1968); Kolesnik, supra note 79, at 75, 81; Levine, supra note 154, at 128;
Lyles, Grouping by Sex, 46 NATL ELEm. PuiN. 38, 39 (1966).
167 See Herman & Criscuolo, supra note 166, at 97; Kolesnik, supra note 79, at 77-78,
81; Levine, supra note 154, at 127; Lyles, supra note 166, at 40.
168 See Fisher & Waetjen, supra note 164, at 412; Herman & Criscuolo, supra note 166,
at 98; Lyles, supra note 166, at 39.
169 See Dale, supra note 76, at 201-2; Levine, supra note 154, at 127.
170 See J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); W. MNDELSON,
DISCRIMINATION 50 (1962).
171 See CoLEMAN, supra note 170. A discussion of some of the attempts to close the
scholastic gap between the races is found in MENDELSON, supra note 170, at 50-59. See
generally EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Harvard Educational Review 1969).
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of-choice" and "free transfer" were given at least three years before
being struck down for the first time,172 and they were not educational
tools but rather devices for desegregation. The goal of desegregation
is, after all, equal educational opportunity, and the courts have traditionally deferred to the educators when matters of how education may
173
best be transmitted have arisen.
In the last analysis, this defense of sex separation appeals to the
"practical flexibility [of the courts] in shaping remedies"'174 which was
specifically recognized in Brown as a necessary attribute of plan evaluation. Because of its cumulative character, this argument, more than any
of the others, will test the courts' facility for "adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."' 75 Whether it will overcome the objections raised earlier in this comment to each of its component parts and
satisfy the burden of persuasion associated with school desegregation
plans is a question that will soon be answered by the courts. The
ultimate relevance of this defense, as well as the relevance of any of the
other justifications which may be offered for sex separation plans, will
depend on the test the court chooses to use in evaluating the success of
the plans in achieving equal educational opportunities. What might be
"reasonably related" to achieving equal educational "opportunities
might not be "necessary" to achieving that goal.
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of sex separation in school desegregation plans raises three
important issues of constitutional dimension. These include the extent
to which the scheme perpetuates the racial discrimination forbidden by
Brown, the validity of the sex classification, and the limits of the fundamental freedom to associate. Given the presence of these issues in the
use of the sex separation schemes and the burden of proof normally
placed on the school boards in plan evaluation, it would seem that
better justifications than those which have thus far been advanced
would be needed if the boards are to persuade the courts of the validity
of this particular scheme. In the final analysis, the courts, in evaluating
the sex-separation plans, will be primarily concerned with the existence
of racial discrimination in the use of the device. If the courts do not
172 See Monroe v. Ed. of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 457 (1968); Green v. New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968).
173 See Brown v. Ed. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham
County, 333 F.2d 55, 61-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 933 (1964); Moore v. Tangipahoa
Parish, 804 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. La. 1969). But see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
174 Brown v. Ed. of Educ., 849 U.S. 294, 800 (1955).
175 Id.
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overturn the use of sex separation in school desegregation plans, they
will be sanctioning racial discrimination by validating plans which
perpetuate a vestige of the racial caste system and foster the very harms
declared unconstitutional over fifteen years ago in the School Desegregation Cases.

